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ABSTRACT
The 2004 Global Labor Survey (GLS) is an Internet-based survey that seeks to measure de facto
labor practices in countries around the world, covering issues such as freedom of association, the
regulation of work contracts, employee benefits and the prevalence of collective bargaining. To find
out about de facto practices, the GLS invited labor practitioners, ranging from union officials and
activists to professors of labor law and industrial relations, to report on conditions in their country.
Over 1,500 persons responded, which allowed us to create indices of practices in ten broad areas for
33 countries. The GLS' focus on de facto labor practices contrasts with recent studies of de jure labor
regulations (Botero et al., 2004) and with more limited efforts to measure labor practices as part of
surveys of economic freedom (Fraser Institute) and competitiveness (World Economic Forum).  
Although our pool of respondents differs greatly from the conservative foundations and business
leaders who contribute respectively to the Fraser Institute and World Economic Forum reports, the
GLS and the labor market components of the economic freedom and competitiveness measures give
similar pictures of labor practices across countries. This similarity across respondents with different
economic interests and ideological perspectives suggests that they are all reporting on labor market
realities in a relatively unbiased way. As a broad summary statement, the GLS shows that practices
favorable to workers are more prevalent in countries with high levels of income per capita; are
associated with less income inequality; are unrelated to aggregate growth rates; but are modestly
positively associated with unemployment.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 This paper reports on an Internet-based survey designed to collect information on the 
state of workplace practices from labor experts and practitioners around the world -- the 2004 
Global Labor Survey (GLS). This effort comes at a time of intense debate over the impact of 
labor market institutions on economic outcomes, in which analysts use diverse indices of 
practices and/or measures of de jure labor regulations to examine the link between the labor 
market and general economic success. On one side of the debate are economists and policy-
makers who attribute some of the economic problems in advanced countries and failures of 
developing countries to labor market rigidities that result from government regulations or union 
activities. On the other side are economists and policy-makers who argue that the redistributive 
and other benefits from regulations and unionism exceed whatever costs they create in the form 
of less flexible markets, and that absent institutions, labor markets do not function as perfect 
invisible hand mechanisms.   
For the advanced countries, the OECD Jobs Study (1994) argued that substantial labor 
market reforms were required to cure the European Union’s economic problems. This view 
found support in some empirical studies, but also led to further work that stressed the frailty of 
many cross-country empirical studies (see Freeman, 2005, for a review of this debate). For 
developing countries, there has been a similar debate. Economists at the World Bank and IMF 
have worried that labor regulations impede the success of economic reforms (Forteza and Rama, 
2002), and often call for greater labor market flexibility to ease adjustment problems; on the 
other hand, those associated with the ILO take the opposite perspective.1 Evidence that Indian 
states with more pro-labor regulations have performed less well in output and employment in the 
                                                 
1
 For example, Baccaro et al. (2003) present a research proposal to try to understand and quantify how labor 
institutions, such as unions and collective bargaining, fit within the larger fabric of social dialogue in an economy.   
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formal manufacturing sector than other Indian states without improving the well-being of 
workers raises questions about the value of such regulations within developing countries (Besley 
and Burgess, 2004). But evidence from other studies has moved the World Bank, the Inter-
American Development Bank, and the Asian Development Bank, among others, toward nuanced 
views about the contribution of labor institutions in development (World Bank, 1995; Inter-
American Development Bank, 2005).  
By developing new and potentially more accurate measures of labor practices, the GLS 
should improve the quality of analysis, and help economists and others reach firmer conclusions 
about the positive or negative effects of given practices on aggregate economic performance.   
Overview 
 The GLS assesses the current state of workplace practices and institutions by surveying 
practitioners and labor relations experts who have firsthand knowledge and experience of de 
facto practices, as opposed to de jure laws or regulations. The GLS was run as an Internet survey 
in 2004 under the auspices of the Labor and Worklife Program (LWP) at the Harvard Law 
School. The survey covered many aspects of labor institutions, including employment 
regulations, the freedom of association, and employee benefits. The question format used a 
seven-point scale that has worked well in surveys of business leaders in the World Economic 
Forum’s Global Competitiveness Report (GCR). We invited members of the International 
Industrial Relations Organization (IIRO), and subscribers and users of www.labourstart.org, the 
news portal dedicated to labor and union affairs, to the GLS website to answer the survey. In 
addition, we contacted persons connected with the LWP and the Harvard Trade Union Program 
to boost responses in countries where we otherwise had trouble getting sufficient respondents. 
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  These efforts produced nearly 1,600 completed surveys from 77 states/territories. 
However, a disproportionate number of responses came from advanced English-speaking 
countries and only a few came from developing countries. If respondents from the same country 
had given widely different answers, the small numbers would have created problems for the 
GLS, but statistical analyses shows that the responses to questions were relatively similar within 
countries, while varying greatly across countries. Thus, only a few respondents per country are 
needed to give a consistent picture of labor practices. In this report, we focus on a subset of 33 
countries in which we had at least 4 responses. We amalgamated questions to construct 
indicators of conditions in the 33 countries under seven headings: General Economic Situation; 
Role of World Bank & IMF; Labor Market Conditions; Freedom of Association & Collective 
Bargaining; Labor Disputes; Employment Regulations & Working Conditions; and Employee 
Benefits. In addition, we report the respondents’ estimates of the percentage of workers in the 
informal sector, the percentage of workers in unions, and the percentage covered by a collective 
bargaining agreement.  
  Over 60% of the respondents to the GLS were union officials or labor activists, most 
holding pro-labor positions on issues. This raises questions about potential bias in answers about 
labor market practices. To examine whether the orientation of respondents affected their reports, 
we analyzed the relationship between respondents’ views on some political and economic issues 
and their responses to the GLS questions. We found only a modest relation, implying that any 
such effect was small. Still, we calibrated answers to adjust for the attitudes of respondents. 
Finally, we compared the calibrated country indices from the GLS with other measures from 
surveys whose respondents were likely to have a pro-business or conservative bias: the World 
Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Report (GCR), which surveys business executives in 
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their country of operation, and the Fraser Institute’s Economic Freedom of the World (EFW) 
study. The respondents on the GLS and those on these surveys gave similar pictures of labor 
practices. This reflects well on the validity of all of the studies, suggesting that they tap a 
common component of information on labor market conditions rather than hinge on the right-left 
or labor-management views of respondents. The only difference we detected among the surveys 
was the opposite of what we anticipated: GLS respondents had a modestly more positive view of 
the labor friendliness of practices than business executives.   
We also compared the GLS indicators with the de jure measures of labor market 
regulation compiled by Botero et al. (2004), and subsequently updated by the World Bank’s 
Doing Business database. The correlation between the GLS and the Botero et al. (2004) data is 
lower than that between the GLS and the EFW and GCR indicators, presumably reflecting the 
divergence between regulations and implementation.  
Finally, we examined how the GLS measures of labor practices varied with the economic 
performance of these countries. We found that countries whose practices are more favorable to 
workers had relatively higher levels of income per capita and lower Gini coefficients. In 
addition, pro-labor practices were unrelated to aggregate growth rates, but were modestly 
associated with higher rates of unemployment. These patterns fit reasonably well with the bulk 
of studies that relate economic outcomes to measures of labor market institutions.   
In sum, the inaugural GLS demonstrates that it is possible to gather detailed, valid 
information on labor practices from labor experts and practitioners in different countries at low 
cost through the Internet. The major weakness of the 2004 survey was the shortfall of responses 
from many developing countries. This can be attributed to the fact that our e-mail contact lists 
included fewer practitioners from developing countries, and to weak Internet connections in 
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some countries that made it difficult for persons to respond. This suggests the need for expanding 
the reach of the GLS, possibly by supplementing the sample through non-Internet-based 
surveying with the assistance of country-based organizations, who could invite practitioners and 
experts to fill out the surveys as part of a conference or at some venue with broadband or other 
fast links. In addition, we would have liked more responses from personnel and labor relations 
practitioners in the business community. Despite these shortcomings, the diagnostics and the 
crosschecks with other data sources showed that the GLS did indeed capture useful systematic 
information for the purposes of cross-country comparisons of labor market institutions.   
 Since measures of actual conditions and practices are necessary to monitor the progress 
of countries towards meeting difficult-to-measure human development objectives, such as 
abolishing child labor, improving safety standards in the workplace (for example, Bohning, 
2003), and raising labor standards more broadly, the GLS’s “ask the practitioners and experts” 
design offers a distinct way to improve monitoring at the country level.2 The design also offers a 
way to obtain objective measures of labor practices in place of subjective categorizations that 
could help resolve open issues in the on-going debate about labor institutions.    
 
2.  SURVEY METHODOLOGY 
The GLS begins by asking respondents their country of expertise, years of involvement 
with labor affairs in this country, and occupation (options included academic, government 
official, union activist, among others).3  The survey then moves to six modules of questions 
about economic and labor issues, as summarized in Table 1: General Economic Situation; The 
                                                 
2
 Such assessments of the protection of workers’ rights and dignity can have operational consequences. For example, 
the California Public Employees Retirement System (CalPERS) commissioned Verité (2003) to draft a report on 
labor conditions around the world, on which it reportedly based some of its emerging market investment decisions.  
3
 In addition, 205 respondents identified themselves as Labourstart correspondents on Question 0.04 of the survey.  
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Labor Market; Freedom of Association & Collective Bargaining; Labor Disputes; Employment 
Regulations & Working Conditions; and Employee Benefits. Several of the question categories 
and some questions were adapted from the GCR or from Botero et al. (2004) to facilitate 
comparisons. The last module asks respondents about their political and policy leanings: whether 
they identify themselves as more left-wing or right-wing; their views on government 
involvement in economic policy; whether the state or workers should bear most of the 
responsibility for ensuring a basic standard of living; and whether international trade agreements 
should contain labor clauses. These questions allow us to identify the orientation of respondents 
and examine whether that affected their answers. (The GLS questions are reproduced in their 
entirety in Appendix Table 1.) 
  The survey instrument uses the question design that has worked successfully in the GCR 
survey of business executives. Respondents are asked to register their assessments on a scale 
from 1 to 7, with the following being a sample question:  
 
 
  Protection of the right to form a union in your country is  
 
Weak or non-existent 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
 
Equal to the worlds’ most 
stringent 
 
Selecting 1: means you agree completely with the answer on the left-hand side  
Selecting 7: means you agree completely with the answer on the right-hand side  
 
Selecting 2: means you largely agree with the left-hand side answer 
Selecting 3: means you somewhat agree with the left-hand side answer 
Selecting 4: means your opinion is indifferent between the two answers 
Selecting 5: means you somewhat agree with the right-hand side answer 
Selecting 6: means you largely agree with the right-hand side answer 
 
 
We designed the GLS questions so that the left side answer (a response of 1) could be broadly 
identified with a pro-business set of institutions or workplace conditions, while the right side 
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answer (a response of 7) corresponded to pro-labor conditions. This question format helped to 
minimize the time to complete the survey.4 In addition, three questions asked for quantitative 
estimates, for example, on the percentage of workers in the informal sector. The survey 
instructions encouraged respondents to skip questions that they were not in a position to answer. 
The default answer for all questions was set at “N/A” (for no response). 
Survey Implementation 
 The GLS was hosted at: http://gls.law.harvard.edu, with the assistance of the Berkman 
Center for Internet and Society at the Harvard Law School. The survey was launched in February 
2004 with an announcement on http://www.labourstart.org, an online news service on trade 
unionism around the world.5 We also sent e-mail invitations to take the survey to members of the 
International Industrial Relations Organization (IIRO) and the European Industrial Relations 
Observatory (EIRO).6 Subsequently, we contacted labor activists and academics in specific 
countries through the Harvard Law School Labor and Worklife Program. At its launch, the GLS 
was available in three languages, English, French and Spanish; a Portuguese version was added 
in November 2004.  
 
3.  SUMMARY STATISTICS, DIAGNOSTICS AND CALIBRATION 
 The GLS received 1,582 responses by late November 2004, with respondents from 77 
states/territories around the world. Table 2 lists these countries and the number of responses from 
each. The vast majority of responses were from English-speaking OCED countries (Australia, 
                                                 
4
 For the sample of 33 countries with more than 4 responses, the mean time to complete the survey was 
approximately 20 minutes, while the median time was just over 14 minutes. This appears to be a reasonable amount 
of time to complete the 82 questions in the survey conscientiously, an important consideration especially for 
developing countries where Internet access might be relatively expensive.  
5
 Labourstart has over 15,000 subscribers and over 230 volunteer correspondents.   
6
 The ILO provided us with the relevant e-mail information for the IIRO, while the contact information for the EIRO 
was obtained from: http://www.eiro.eurofound.eu.int/contact.html. 
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Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States), but there were also responses from 
developing countries such as China (7), India (15), Mexico (7), Peru (14), and South Africa (10).  
As noted, the bulk of our analysis concentrates on the 33 states that had 4 or more responses, as 
listed at the bottom of Table 2. These 33 states made up 1,514 of the 1,582 responses received.  
 Table 3 shows that the typical respondent (for the full sample of 1,582 responses) was a 
labor activist or union official with substantial experience in labor affairs.7 Almost two-thirds of 
respondents reported that they had more than 10 years of experience monitoring or participating 
in labor issues in their country; and an additional 15.6% said that they had between 5-10 years of 
experience (Table 3A).  In addition, Table 3B shows that labor union officials and activists made 
up just over three-fifths (60.8%) of the respondents, followed by academics (18.3%) and 
government officials (4.4%). Consistent with this background, most respondents gave pro-labor 
and left-oriented assessments on questions about their personal views on economic and political 
issues (Table 3C). On a 1 to 7 scale, where 1 was the most conservative and 7 the most left-wing 
orientation, scores averaged 5.2 to 6.4, across Questions 7.01 to 7.04.  
Statistical Diagnostics  
For the GLS to provide useful information about differences in labor practices across 
countries, responses to survey questions must vary significantly across countries while showing 
consistency within countries.  As a first test of whether GLS respondents agreed about their 
country’s conditions, we calculated the rWG statistic for inter-rater reliability based on James, 
Demaree and Wolf (1984). This statistic measures the extent of agreement in the answers among 
respondents from the same country compared to a specified null hypothesis. We calculated this 
                                                 
7
 The percentages in Table 3 are similar when the sample is restricted to the 33 countries with at least 4 responses.  
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statistic for clusters of questions in our labor market indices separately for each country. 
Specifically, for a given module of J questions, the rWG statistic was calculated as: 
       J [ 1 - (sx2 / σ N2)] 
rWG    ---------------------------------------- 
          J [ 1 - (sx2 / σ N2)]  + (sx2 / σ N2) 
     
where sx2 denotes the mean variance of observed responses across the J questions in the module, 
and σN2 is the variance of the null distribution against which we are comparing the observed 
distribution of responses. For the null, we adopt a discrete uniform distribution, so that σN2 is the 
variance we would observe if the respondents had picked their answers randomly by giving each 
possible response equal probability.8  
  The test statistics reported in Table 4A show a high degree of agreement among 
respondents for most countries. The rWG statistic fell below the critical value of 0.7 for only the 
handful of countries listed in the rightmost column of the table. The values were lower for 
Module 7, which asked for personal views on issues rather than factual matters.9  
Did the GLS respondents agree more or less on labor practices in their country compared 
to respondents on the widely used Global Competitiveness Report (GCR), which uses the same 
1-to-7 scoring system? To answer this question, we calculated rWG statistics using data on 
individual respondents from the 2002 GCR.10   The rWG values ranged from 0.81 to 0.96 for the 
GCR “Human Resources” modules, which had nine questions on labor-related issues -- 
reassuringly in the same ballpark as most of our rWG statistics for the GLS. The high GLS rWG 
                                                 
8
 For the questions on the seven-point scale, this means picking each response with probability 1/7, which gives σN2 
= 4. For the three questions that seek percentage estimates, this means picking each of the 5 options (0-20%, 21-
40%,…, 81-100%) with probably 1/5 each; in this case, σN2 = 2.  For these quantitative questions, we set J = 1 in the 
expression for the rWG statistic.  
9
 It should be acknowledged, however, that the agreement statistics were much poorer for the GLS questions that 
sought quantitative estimates, namely questions 2.10, 3.01 and 3.08. This suggests that it is not easy to get a good 
consensus gauge of these percentages even from labor market insiders. 
10
 Andrew Warner made the raw data for the 2002 GCR available to us. There were 97 countries in the GCR sample, 
where the response count ranged from 10 (Israel) to 250 (Russia).   
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statistics and their similarity to the GCR rWG statistics give us confidence that the GLS accurately 
identified country workplace practices and institutions.11  
   As a second test diagnostic, we computed the Intra-class Correlation Coefficient (ICC): 
      σB
2
                     MSB  - MSW 
           ICC    ---------------  =  ------------------------- 
             σB
2
 + σW
2
           MSB  +  (k-1)MSW 
 
where σW2 is the within-country variance and σB2 is the between-country variance in responses to 
questions. The ICC thus measures the share of total variability accounted for by the between-
country component. Thus, the higher the ICC, the more the variation in individual responses 
reflects differences in assessments across countries rather than disagreements among individuals 
within country.  As the equation shows, the ICC can be re-written in terms of MSB and MSW, the 
between-country and within-country mean sum of squares from a standard ANOVA table, and k, 
which depends on the mean number of respondents per country (Shrout and Fleiss 1979).12 
Based on the ICC, we also computed the following Spearman-Brown (SB) prediction formula:  
                   k*ICC  
      SB    ---------------------  
                    1 + (k-1)*ICC 
 
which measures the estimated reliability of the country-averaged scores.13 
  We calculated the ICC and SB statistics for each individual question. Table 4B gives 
summary values of these statistics for each part of the GLS. The ICC values for the first six 
modules of the survey ranged between 0.06 and 0.57, with the corresponding SB reliability 
statistic ranging between 0.69 and 0.98. By way of comparison, the ICC values for the 2002 
GCR questions on “Human Resources” were between 0.22 and 0.52, with the SB reliability 
                                                 
11
 In computing the rWG, we excluded responses that were only partially filled in. We also checked the data to ensure 
that no consecutive sets of survey responses were carbon copies of one another.  
12
 Here k = (N - Σ i ni2/ N) / (m-1), where N is the total number of individual observations, ni is the number of 
observations from country i, and m is the total number of countries in the sample. 
13
 See Winer, Brown and Michels (1991). The ICC and SB are computed using the “loneway” function in STATA.  
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statistic ranging between 0.94 and 0.98. This contrast shows greater dispersion in the within-
country reliability in the GLS than in the GCR, due in large part to the smaller sample and more 
unbalanced observation counts across countries in the GLS. Still, about one half of the GLS 
questions yielded ICC values comparable to those from the 2002 GCR (falling between 0.22 and 
0.52).  Not surprisingly, the ICC and SB statistics of relative variability are low for Module 7 of 
the GLS, which asked for personal views rather than facts about labor conditions. 
Calibration for Modal Respondent 
  As noted, the sample of respondents to the GLS consists disproportionately of union 
officials and activists, and of persons with a left orientation.  If respondents with particular 
attributes gave strikingly different answers to questions for the same country, the particularities 
of respondents could be biasing the patterns among countries.  To control for this possibility, we 
ran a multivariate regression linking responses on the GLS to the characteristics and attitudes of 
respondents for the 33 countries with at least 4 respondents:   
yci (Q) = Dcountryc + Doccupation + Dexperience + Dlabourstart + … 
... + β1 × q701 + β2 × q702 + β3 × q703 + β4 × q704 + υc + εci 
Here, yci (Q) is the response given by respondent i from country c for question Q; the D variables 
are dummy variables for countries, Dcountryc; occupation, Doccupation;14 years of experience 
with labor affairs, Dexperience;15 and whether the respondent is a Labourstart correspondent, 
Dlabourstart.16 The measures of left-right orientation are responses on q701 through q704, 
which asked for individual’s personal positions on political and economic issues. The regressions 
were estimated to allow for standard errors clustered by country (υc). 
                                                 
14
 The dummies are for the eight occupational categories listed in Question 0.03, plus an additional category for no 
response.  All responses “Other” were lumped as one category.  
15
 The dummies are for: Less than 1 year of experience; 1 to 5 years of experience; 5-10 years of experience; more 
than 10 years of experience; plus a category for “NA” (no response). 
16
 This included an additional dummy for the category “NA” (no response). 
 14 
 To correct for differences in respondents’ attitudes, we used the above regressions to 
estimate for each question the response that would have been given by a hypothetical modal 
respondent with neutral political and economic views. The modal profile corresponded to that of 
a “Labor union official” with “More than 10 years” of experience, who was not a Labourstart 
correspondent.  Neutral views corresponded to those of someone who gave the midpoint answer 
(4 on the seven-point scale) for each of the Module 7 questions. These calculations gave us 
estimated scores (as well as standard errors) for each question, which we then averaged by 
module to obtain country aggregates. In this manner, we constructed 10 summary indices of 
labor conditions. Table 5 gives these indices by country, sorted in descending order of score.17 
We mark the indices for which the rWG statistic was smaller than the critical value of 0.7 in Table 
4A by an asterisk to indicate that the score was based on a low level of inter-rater agreement.  
  How did these calibrated indices compare with a simpler uncalibrated within-country 
mean of respondent scores? Looking across the 75 questions in Modules 1-6 of the GLS, the 
minimum cross-country correlation between the calibrated and uncalibrated scores was 0.840, 
while the mean correlation was a very high 0.963. This high correlation implies that the ordering 
of country scores is largely preserved under different ways of aggregating the raw survey data.18 
The rest of this paper uses the indices calibrated to account for respondent characteristics.  
  Effect of Respondent Orientation  
  We assess in Table 6 how much the political orientation and attitudes of individual 
respondents affected the overall assessments of labor practices. This table reports the results 
                                                 
17
 Values for each individual question are available upon request.   
18
 The country rankings for all the labor market indicators were virtually identical if the calibration regressions were 
run by weighting observation  yci (Q) by the number of responses from country c. For the 75 questions in Modules 1-
6 of the GLS, the minimum cross-country correlation between the scores calibrated with weights and that calibrated 
without weights was 0.993, while the mean correlation was 0.998. Tables based on the weighted calibration 
procedure or on the uncalibrated procedure are available upon request.  
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from regressions of our calibrated indices on various measures of individual respondent 
characteristics, including the questions on political attitudes. The regression coefficients on the 
Module 7 variables show little relation to how the respondents reported conditions: Only 3 of 
these 28 regression coefficients are significant at a 10% level, while the vast majority of the 
occupational coefficients are also statistically insignificant. In short, the impact of personal 
biases on the labor market indicators is modest at best, providing further reassurance of the 
reasonably high level of objectivity in the assessments contained in the GLS.  It is because 
responses are only modestly affected by attitudes that the calibrated indices and the un-calibrated 
indices are so highly correlated.  
 
4.  THE GLS LABOR MARKET INDICES 
 The GLS indices in Table 5 capture several familiar patterns of cross-country differences 
in labor conditions, for instance between the United States and advanced Europe.  
 General Economic Situation: This index averaged the responses for questions 1.01-1.09 
(Module 1a) regarding the level of the economy and the level of disparities in living standards 
within a country. The scores from developed countries were higher than those reported from 
developing countries, implying better economic performance and lower inequality. Still, the 
United States had a score of 3.762 that placed it in the lower half of countries, reflecting its high 
level of inequality among advanced countries.  By contrast, Japan ranked 9th despite the 
prolonged recession that it experienced, which reflects the fact that the provision of public 
services such as education and healthcare remain widely accessible.  
  Role of World Bank and IMF: This measure took the mean response for questions 1.10-
1.12 (Module 1b) about the extent of World Bank and IMF influence on domestic economic 
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policy. Overall, the low scores indicate that respondents assessed the World Bank and the IMF to 
have favored the interests of business over that of workers.  Several countries that received IMF 
rescue packages during recent financial crises, in particular Brazil, Mexico and South Korea, 
reported relatively high scores, consistent with the perception that these international 
organizations wield a large influence on domestic policies. 
 Labor Market Conditions: This index was the mean response for all the Module 2 
questions, except question 2.10. The issues captured included how wages are set, the frequency 
of wage arrears, and the incidence of child labor and gender discrimination (both key targets of 
the ILO’s fundamental conventions). Table 5 indicates that developed countries scored high on 
this index, with the United States being the major exception. Developing countries, including 
India and China, ranked among the bottom 10 countries.   
 Freedom of Association & Collective Bargaining: This indicator averaged the responses 
from Module 3, excluding questions 3.01 and 3.08. Developing countries ranked low on labor 
union strength, while the Western European countries had much higher rankings. The United 
States and the United Kingdom had the lowest scores from the developed countries, ranking 20th 
and 22nd respectively. 
 Labor Disputes: This index averaged responses for Module 4 of the GLS. According to 
the index, the frequency of labor unrest and employer-employee conflict was lowest in countries 
such as Turkey, Singapore, and the United States. In contrast, France, Belgium and Italy had the 
highest scores, reflecting the strength of labor movements in these Western Europe countries.  
 Employment Regulations & Working Conditions: This index gave the average of 
responses to Module 5, which deals with the extent of regulation of the labor market, such as the 
ease of hiring and firing. Low scores indicate a higher propensity towards employer discretion, 
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whereas higher scores indicate a greater use of labor regulations or collective bargaining 
agreements to determine the terms of work contracts. The United States ranked 2nd lowest among 
all countries, with a score virtually indistinguishable from China; this is indicative of the large 
scope and bargaining power of employers in the negotiation of contract terms with workers. The 
United Kingdom placed 10th from the bottom. Labor regulation and collective bargaining were 
most influential in Western Europe, particularly in Scandinavian countries.  
 Employee Benefits: This index was the mean of responses in Module 6, covering pension 
schemes, sickness benefits and unemployment insurance. The trends and ranking mirrored 
closely those in the “Employment Regulations & Working Conditions” index: Relatively low 
levels of benefits in developing countries, and higher levels in developed countries. Once again, 
the United States and the United Kingdom had significantly lower benefit levels compared to the 
rest of the developed world.   
Quantitative Estimates 
The GLS asked respondents to estimate the percentage of workers in the informal sector; 
the percentage who are labor union members; and the percentage covered by a collective 
bargaining agreement. These were coded on a 1-to-5 scale, with 1 representing 0-20% and 5 
representing 80-100%. There was greater variability in the responses to these questions than in 
many other questions, but even so, the estimates from the GLS were highly correlated with the 
percentage unionized, as well as the percentage employment in the unofficial economy reported 
in Botero et al. (2004), as illustrated in Figure 1. 
 % of workers in informal sector (Question 2.10): Developed countries yielded low 
estimates for this index, ranging between a response of 1 and 2. The informal sector was large in 
developing countries, where the Philippines, Peru and India had scores near 4.   
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 % of workers who are labor union members (Question 3.01): Unionization rates were 
higher among the developed countries, with Denmark and Sweden approaching a score of 5. 
Several developing countries reported moderate levels of unionization, including Brazil, Mexico, 
Sri Lanka and India. The GLS accurately captured the low rates of union membership in France 
and the United States.  
 % of labor force covered by a collective bargaining agreement (Question 3.08): The 
trends in collective bargaining coverage mirrored closely that of the labor union membership 
estimates. The main exceptions were several European countries, such as France, Italy and the 
Netherlands, where such agreements extend collective bargaining to workers broadly in the 
economy, so that the coverage rates exceed union membership rates.   
Do Workplace Institutions Form Systems? 
To see whether workplace institutions and practices come together as a bundle, we 
calculated a correlation matrix for all of the summary indices (Table 7). The correlation matrix 
suggests that workplace institutions broadly fit together into labor relations systems that can be 
classified as more or less favorable to workers. For example, looking at the third row, economies 
with more pro-worker “Labor Market Conditions” in terms of wage-setting institutions also tend 
to have greater “Freedom of Association & Collective Bargaining” and higher levels of 
“Employee Benefits”.  They also have a low “% informal sector”, as well as high unionization 
and collective bargaining coverage rates.  
The rightmost column in the table on “Personal Views & Positions” shows how the mean 
across responses to the Module 7 questions are correlated with the other measures.  Consistent 
with the regression coefficients in Table 6, this indicator is only weakly correlated with the labor 
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market indices.  There is some evidence suggesting that countries where respondents were more 
leftwing tended to give lower marks in assessing the impact of the IMF & World Bank.  
  In sum, the indices show that developed countries have a more pro-worker orientation, 
with more regulation of markets and greater union activity. The exceptions to this pattern are the 
United States, and to a lesser extent the United Kingdom, where labor unions are systematically 
weaker and labor markets are subject to less regulation than in the rest of the OECD.  
 
5. COMPARISON WITH OTHER MEASURES  
 To see how the cross-country variation in labor market institutions and regulations in the 
GLS compares to the picture from other sources, we have gathered measures of labor conditions 
from: the Global Competitiveness Report survey of business executives; the Botero et al. (2004) 
measures on formal labor regulations; and the Fraser Institute’s Economic Freedom around the 
World index. We proceed to discuss the correlation between these and the GLS measures.  
Global Competitiveness Report (GCR)  
  The World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Report offers the best comparison 
with the GLS, since we adopted the same seven-point scale and question format from the GCR, 
while adapting some questions for the GLS to facilitate direct comparisons. The GCR asks 
managers about economic conditions in their country of operation, which should produce 
responses favorable to employer interests, in contrast to the pro-labor orientation of the GLS 
sample. Agreement between the two surveys on factual issues would thus go a long way towards 
validating both surveys. 
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For our analysis, we matched 14 GLS questions with their counterparts in the 2004 GCR, 
as listed in Appendix Table 2.19 The correlation between the GCR and GLS country scores for 
these questions was statistically significant at the 1% level for all but two pairs, and even on 
those questions, there was a high correlation with closely related questions.20 The correlation 
coefficient ranged from a low of 0.44 to a high of 0.93 for the 12 significantly correlated pairs. 
  Similar results were obtained when we matched the GLS to the 2002 GCR.21 Excluding 
the questions pertaining to the World Bank and IMF, there were 11 question pairs, all of which 
were significantly correlated at least at the 5% level. For the questions assessing the role of the 
World Bank and IMF, the correlation with the corresponding GLS questions was generally 
insignificant, except for one match: Greater World Bank and IMF influence on the domestic 
economy (GLS Question 1.10) was associated with lower ratings on the IMF’s effectiveness in 
promoting high levels of employment and real income (2002 GCR Question 12.02B). On the 
whole, there is greater divergence between the business community and labor practitioners in 
their assessments on the impact of the World Bank and IMF than in their assessments of 
workplace practices.  
 
The Regulation of Labor: Botero et al. (2004) and the Doing Business Database 
  We also compared the GLS measures with data on the regulation of labor from Botero et 
al. (2004), which is based on de jure government regulations and legal provisions, benchmarked 
                                                 
19
 The GCR scores for each question are based on a simple mean of the responses for a country. The GCR has a 
reverse coding of answering options, so that 7 is the most “pro-business” response and 1 the most “pro-labor”. For 
consistency with the GLS, we transformed the GCR data by taking 8 minus the GCR scores.   
20
 The insignificant correlations were for: GLS question 5.01 on the determination of contract terms for hiring full-
time workers and GCR question 7.02 on the hiring and firing of workers; and GLS question 2.14 on gender 
discrimination and GCR question 7.17 on how wages for women compare to that for men for similar work. But 
GCR question 7.02 displays a highly significant correlation with GLS question 5.10 on the ease of firing, while 
GCR question 7.16 on employment opportunities for women was significantly correlated with GLS question 2.14. 
21
 The number of countries in the sample drops to 32 with the 2002 GCR, which does not include Cyprus. 
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to 1997. The regulation data was aggregated into indices on: Employment laws, Collective 
relations laws, and Social security laws, with higher values indicating a greater extent of labor 
regulation.22 Again, we have natural comparisons because we designed the GLS to cover many 
of the same labor institutions.23 
 The top part of Table 8 records the correlation between the ten GLS indices and the 
Botero et al. (2004) labor regulation measures. The Employment laws index and the Social 
security laws index are significantly correlated with the GLS indices on workplace conditions 
from Modules 2-6 (“Labor Market Conditions” through “Employee Benefits”). In addition, the 
Social security laws index was highly correlated with the “General Economic Situation” index 
and negatively correlated with the “% informal sector” variable. As for the Collective relations 
laws index, this had a significant correlation with the “Labor Disputes” module which covers the 
same set of issues, but was in general uncorrelated with most of the other GLS variables.   
Although the GLS indices were consistent with the rankings by Botero et al. (2004), the 
correlations between the GLS and Botero et al. are much smaller than the correlations between 
the GLS and the GCR. We attribute part of this to the fact that Botero et al. measure de jure labor 
regulations, which will inevitably diverge from de facto workplace practices.24 In addition, there 
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 Each index comes from component indices, most coded on a 0-1 scale. For example, one of the sub-indices under 
the Collective relations index concerns the “Right to Unionization”. This was coded 1 if the right to form a labor 
union was in the constitution, and coded 0 if the constitution did not refer to unions. Values of 0.33 or 0.67 were 
assigned for intermediate cases (for example, the constitution mentions unions, but not the right to form one.)   
23
 Module 4 of the GLS on “Labor Disputes” parallels the Collective relations index, Module 5 on “Employment 
Regulations & Working Conditions” parallels the component indices of their Employment laws index; Module 6 on 
“Employee Benefits” mirrors their Social security laws index.  
24
 This de jure-de facto distinction is illustrated by the range of correlations found between some indices from 
Botero et al. and questions in the GLS. For example, the correlation between the “Right to Unionization” variable 
from Botero et al. and GLS question 3.03 on the protection of the right to form a union was a mere 0.02.  By 
contrast, the Botero et al. dummy variable for whether the social security system protected against the risk of 
unemployment had a correlation of 0.77 with GLS question 6.06 on the extent to which unemployment benefits 
were determined by regulations or collective bargaining as opposed to by employers. 
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are differences in the component questions that underlie the two measures.25  Table 8 also gives 
the correlations between the GLS and Botero et al. estimates of “% informal sector” and “% 
labor union” that are graphed in Figure 1. The insignificant correlation between the “% collective 
bargaining” index and the “Right to Collective Bargaining” dummy variable from Botero et al. 
likely stems once again from the distinction between the de jure constitutional right and the 
actual de facto extension of collective bargaining agreements.  
  The World Bank’s Doing Business database, set up to update measures of formal 
regulation per Botero et al. (2004), offers a further comparison between de jure and de facto 
labor practices. The most recent edition of the Doing Business database contains a Rigidity of 
Employment Index benchmarked to January 2004, based on laws relating to the hiring and firing 
workers, and the rigidity of work hours. The row labeled “Doing Business” in Table 8 shows that 
this index was uncorrelated with any GLS measures of workplace conditions, including the GLS 
index on “Employment Regulations and Working Conditions”. Again, this is a warning that legal 
regulations need not tell what actually happens in work places.  
Economic Freedom of the World (EFW) 
  Our third cross-check comes from the index of labor regulation compiled in the 2004 
Economic Freedom of the World Report, sponsored by the Fraser Institute, whose assessment of 
labor regulations is predicated on a position advocating laissez-faire institutions.  The labor 
regulation index (Area 5B of the EFW, Gwartney and Lawson, 2004) consisted of five 
components: Impact of the minimum wage; Hiring and firing practices; Labor force share with 
wages set by centralized bargaining; Unemployment insurance; and Use of conscripts. The first 
four components incorporated information from recent editions (2001-2003) of the GCR, but we 
                                                 
25
 For example, the GLS asked (in question 6.03) about the prevalence of private pension programs, an area that is 
not covered by Botero et al.  
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still treated the overall index as a valid assessment of the extent of labor regulation.  As shown in 
the final row of Table 8, the EFW index was negatively correlated with most of the GLS indices 
of workplace conditions, as it should since the EFW codes pro-labor regulation as undesirable.   
 In sum, our cross-checks show that most sources are in broad agreement on the 
approximate ranking of countries regarding the degree to which their institutions favor labor 
versus business interests. The union leaders and activists on the GLS, the business executives on 
the GCR, and the conservative analysts for the Fraser Institute’s economic freedom measures are 
in broad agreement about actual practices, though they presumably differ greatly in the value 
judgments that they attach to the practices.  
 
6.  CORRELATION WITH ECONOMIC OUTCOMES 
  Is the GLS ranking of countries by labor practices connected with broad economic 
conditions?  As a first step towards answering this question, we sorted the 33 countries into 
quartiles based on the mean real GDP per capita from 2001-2003, as reported in the World 
Development Indicators (WDI). Table 9 shows one dominant fact from this analysis: Countries 
that are more developed tend to have more pro-labor workplace institutions and practices. The 
mean (and median) scores on “Labor Market Conditions” through “Employee Benefits” (based 
on Parts 2-6 of the GLS), as well as “% labor union” and “% collective bargaining” are higher as 
we move towards higher income quartiles, although there is some tapering off between the 3rd 
and 4th highest quartiles. In addition, richer countries had higher scores on the “General 
Economic Situation” index, as well as a smaller “% informal sector”. These patterns are very 
robust to an alternative sorting into income brackets, as given by the World Bank’s classification 
of Developing, High-income non-OECD and OECD countries. 
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  This systematic variation of workplace conditions with income levels is further 
confirmed by Table10, which displays the results from a series of least-squares regressions of 
various economic outcome variables on each GLS index in turn. The bivariate regressions on the 
2001-2003 mean level of real GDP per capita point once again to more pro-labor conditions been 
associated with higher country income levels.26  
Column 2 of Table 10 examines the relation between the indices of labor institutions and 
inequality of incomes, as measured by the Gini coefficients from Deininger and Squire (1996), 
restricting the data to points they label as “high quality”. The consistently negative coefficients 
on the various labor market indicators, as well as on “% labor union” and “% collective 
bargaining” suggest that pro-labor institutions redistribute income towards employees.   
The next column of Table 10 shows that the growth rate of real GDP per capita 
(computed as an average over a three-year period, 2000-2003) is unrelated to labor practices. 
With regards to the unemployment rate (also taken from the WDI),27 the “Freedom of 
Association & Collective Bargaining”, “Labor Disputes” and “Employment Regulations & 
Working Conditions” indices had positive coefficients that were significant at the 10% level, 
suggesting a moderate correlation between pro-labor institutions and unemployment.28 Finally, 
we explored the possible causal links in these relations, using a set of legal origin dummies as 
instrumental variables for the GLS indices.29  In the IV estimates labor institutions remained 
correlated to GDP per capita and inequality, but not to the growth rate and the unemployment 
rate (regressions not shown). 
                                                 
26
 We obtained similar results with a 5-year log average of real GDP per capita as dependent variable. 
27
 The unemployment rate for 2001 was used, as it was the most recent year in the WDI for which data was available 
for almost all countries in our sample (31 out of 33 countries).  
28
 However, these coefficients are not significant if we remove the level of real GDP per capita from the regression.   
29
 The instrumental variables were dummies for British, French, German, Scandinavian and socialist legal origin. 
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7.  CONCLUSION 
  This study has demonstrated the feasibility of asking labor practitioners and experts over 
the Internet about actual labor practices in their country.  The GLS obtained responses from 
nearly 1,600 respondents in a large number of countries.  The responses tended to agree on 
practices within country while showing considerable cross-country variation. Based on the 
survey, we constructed labor market indices for 33 countries and found that our measures 
correlated well with the estimates of labor market conditions and regulations from the 
comparable GCR and Fraser EFW measures of labor markets around the world.  The data 
suggests further that workplace conditions that offer workers more safeguards and benefits tend 
to be associated with countries with higher levels of income per capita and less inequality, are 
unrelated to growth rates, and weakly positively correlated with unemployment rates.  
The major weakness of the 2004 survey was the small sample of respondents from many 
developing countries. In part, this was because e-mail lists included only a few practitioners in 
those countries, and because weak Internet connections might have made it difficult for them to 
respond. This suggests the need for expanding the reach of the survey by obtaining assistance 
from country-based organizations to supplement the Internet sample through non-Internet-based 
surveying, for example by inviting country practitioners and experts to fill out the surveys as part 
of a conference. Translating the survey into more languages and having it available on a widely 
used web site rather than as a stand-alone URL might also have increased the responses. In 
addition, the survey would have benefited from more responses from personnel and labor 
relations practitioners from the business community. Despite these shortcomings, the diagnostics 
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and the crosschecks with other data sources showed that the GLS captured useful information for 
comparing actual labor market practices across countries. 
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TABLE 1: Module Structure of the Global Labor Survey (GLS) 
 
  Number and Name of Module Issues Covered 
1.  General Economic Situation  Economic growth; Unemployment and poverty; 
Influence of IMF and World Bank on country policies. 
2.  The Labor Market Wage-setting; Enforcement of minimum wage policies; 
Wage arrears; Prevalence of child labor; Gender 
discrimination. 
3.  Freedom of Association & 
Collective Bargaining 
Legal and economic position of unions. 
4.  Labor Disputes Nature and frequency of industrial disputes; Institutions 
for resolving labor conflicts. 
5.  Employment Regulations & 
Working Conditions 
Effect of regulations and collective bargaining on labor 
contracts, work hours, hiring and firing decisions. 
6.  Employee Benefits Pension schemes; Sickness benefits; Unemployment 
insurance.  
7.  Concluding Questions Respondents’ views on several economic and political 
issues.  
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TABLE 2: Response Counts by Country 
 
Country  ISO code Count 
Argentina   ARG 3 
Australia   AUS 203 
Austria   AUT 4 
Barbados   BRB 3 
Belgium   BEL 9 
Benin   BEN 1 
Bhutan   BTN 1 
Botswana   BWA 1 
Brazil   BRA 32 
Bulgaria   BGR 1 
Burkina Faso   BFA 1 
Canada   CAN 457 
Cape Verde   CPV 1 
Chile   CHL 3 
China   CHN 7 
Cyprus   CYP 11 
Czech Republic   CZE 1 
Denmark   DNK 8 
Djibouti   DJI 1 
Dominican Republic   DOM 1 
Estonia   EST 1 
Fiji   FJI 1 
Finland   FIN 4 
France   FRA 7 
Germany   DEU 11 
Ghana   GHA 1 
Greece   GRC 3 
Haiti   HTI 1 
Hong Kong   HKG 3 
Hungary   HUN 2 
India   IND 15 
Indonesia   IDN 3 
Ireland   IRL 8 
Israel ISR 13 
Italy ITA 6 
Jamaica JAM 1 
Japan JPN 6 
Kenya KEN 1 
Korea, South KOR 5 
Country  ISO code Count 
Latvia LVA 2 
Lebanon LBN 1 
Libya LBY 1 
Malaysia MYS 5 
Mexico MEX 7 
Nepal NPL 1 
Netherlands NLD 14 
New Zealand NZL 40 
Nigeria NGA 3 
Norway NOR 32 
Oman OMN 1 
Pakistan PAK 2 
Palestinian Territory PSE 1 
Peru PER 14 
Philippines PHL 8 
Portugal PRT 2 
Puerto Rico PRI 1 
Romania ROU 2 
Rwanda RWA 2 
Sierra Leone SLE 1 
Singapore SGP 5 
Slovenia SVN 1 
South Africa ZAF 10 
Spain ESP 3 
Sri Lanka LKA 5 
Sweden SWE 13 
Switzerland CHE 4 
Taiwan TWN 8 
Thailand THA 2 
Trinidad & Tobago TTO 1 
Turkey TUR 4 
United Kingdom GBR 139 
United States USA 400 
United States Minor 
Outlying Islands UMI 1 
Venezuela VEN 2 
Vietnam YNM 1 
Yugoslavia YUG 1 
Zimbabwe ZWE 1 
 
33  countries / territories with at least 4 respondents:  Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, 
China, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, India, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea (South), 
Malaysia, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, the Philippines, Singapore, South 
Africa, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Turkey, the United Kingdom, the United States.  
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TABLE 3: Summary of Respondent Characteristics 
 
Sample: All countries  
 
Panel A: Years of experience in country’s labor affairs (Question 0.02) 
 Counts Percent (%) 
Less than 1 year 44 2.8% 
1 to 5 years 247 15.6% 
5 to 10 years 247 15.6% 
More than 10 years 1039 65.7% 
Total 1582 99.7% 
Notes: Total does not sum to 100% because of 5 observations left blank by respondents. Percentages are similar 
when restricted to the 33 countries with 4 or more respondents.  
 
 
Panel B: Background of survey respondents (Question 0.03) 
 Counts Percent (%) 
Academic 290 18.3% 
Corporate official 35 2.2% 
Government official 69 4.4% 
Independent lawyer / arbitrator 28 1.8% 
Journalist / Reporter 20 1.3% 
Labor activist 465 29.4% 
Labor union official 496 31.4% 
Other 135 8.5% 
Total 1538 97.2% 
Notes: Total does not sum to 100% because of 44 observations left blank by respondents. Percentages are similar 
when restricted to the 33 countries with 4 or more respondents.  
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TABLE 3 (continued): Summary of Respondent Characteristics 
 
Sample: All countries 
 
Panel C: Responses on Personal Views and Positions 
Survey question N Mean Std Dev 
7.01: Political stance (right-wing        
versus left-wing) 
1539 5.650 1.264 
7.02: Proper role of government in 
economic policy-making 
1552 6.039 1.218 
7.03: Should workers or employers/the 
state bear most responsibility for 
employment and living standards?
 
1550 5.165 1.868 
7.04: Need for global labor standards in 
international trade agreements 
1558 6.415 1.339 
 
Notes: Responses were on a scale of 1 to 7, with 1 corresponding to a position most favorable towards private 
businesses and employers, and 7 corresponding to a position most favorably disposed towards workers’ interests.  
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TABLE 4: Within-Country Reliability and Agreement of Survey Responses  
 
Sample: Countries with at least 4 respondents (33 countries, unless otherwise stated) 
 
Panel A: James, Demaree and Wolf rWG Statistic 
Agreement: rWG Mean Min Max rWG < 0.7 
Module 1a, qn 1.01-1.09 0.93 0.65 0.98 Taiwan 
Module 1b, qn 1.10-1.12 0.85 0.64 0.99 Denmark ; Norway 
Module 2 (excl. qn 2.10) 0.92 0.36 0.98 Taiwan  
Module 3 (excl. qn 3.01, 3.08) 0.91 0.68 0.99 China 
Module 4 0.92 0.76 0.97 --- 
Module 5 0.90 0.30 0.98 Taiwan 
Module 6 0.88 0.41 0.98 Taiwan 
Module 7 0.84 0.65 0.97 Brazil ; India 
Notes:  The multiple-item scale rWG statistic was computed; this captures the extent of agreement among the 
respondents from each country for each module of questions. The critical value of 0.7 for this statistic is regarded as 
a minimum threshold level of inter-respondent agreement. The sample of countries shrinks to 32 in the row for 
questions 1.10-1.12 only because of omissions in the responses for Finland. The min, max and mean are computed 
across countries.   
 
 
Panel B: Intraclass Correlation Coefficient (ICC) and Spearman-Brown prediction formula (SB) 
 ICC SB 
 Mean Min Max Mean Min Max 
Module 1a, qn 1.01-1.09 0.38 0.16 0.54 0.95 0.88 0.98 
Module 1b, qn 1.10-1.12 0.14 0.11 0.17 0.83 0.79 0.86 
Module 2 (excl. qn 2.10) 0.15 0.06 0.27 0.83 0.69 0.93 
Module 3 (excl. qn 3.01, 3.08) 0.27 0.07 0.57 0.90 0.75 0.98 
Module 4 0.22 0.13 0.41 0.90 0.84 0.96 
Module 5 0.22 0.07 0.43 0.89 0.75 0.97 
Module 6 0.26 0.13 0.54 0.91 0.83 0.98 
Module 7 0.09 0.02 0.19 0.70 0.46 0.90 
Notes:  ICC for qn 2.10 = 0.28; for qn 3.01 = 0.58; for qn 3.08 = 0.59. SB for qn 2.10 = 0.93; for qn 3.01 = 0.98; for 
qn 3.08 = 0.98. The min, max and mean are computed across questions in each module.  
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 TABLE 5: Indices of Labor Market and Workplace Conditions  
 
Module 1a (qn 1.01-1.09 only) 
General Economic Situation 
 
 Country Mean Std Dev 
1 Norway 5.809 0.128 
2 Sweden 5.614 0.103 
3 Finland 5.532 0.146 
4 Denmark 5.444 0.117 
5 Netherlands 5.174 0.123 
6 Switzerland 5.173 0.138 
7 Cyprus 5.079 0.136 
8 New Zealand 5.040 0.117 
9 Japan 4.958 0.156 
10 Belgium 4.887 0.150 
11 Taiwan * 4.854 0.148 
12 Ireland 4.824 0.130 
13 Germany 4.802 0.176 
14 Canada 4.660 0.108 
15 Austria 4.643 0.154 
16 Australia 4.634 0.112 
17 United Kingdom 4.628 0.112 
18 Malaysia 4.625 0.131 
19 Singapore 4.553 0.133 
20 France 4.433 0.122 
21 Israel 4.222 0.157 
22 Italy 3.842 0.167 
23 United States 3.762 0.111 
24 Korea, South 3.723 0.123 
25 China 3.554 0.124 
26 India 2.884 0.119 
27 Sri Lanka 2.851 0.133 
28 Mexico 2.682 0.150 
29 Brazil 2.646 0.149 
30 South Africa 2.609 0.152 
31 Turkey 2.547 0.166 
32 Philippines 2.406 0.129 
33 Peru 2.255 0.137 
Module 1b (qn 1.10-1.12 only) 
Role of World Bank & IMF 
 
 Country Mean Std Dev 
1 Cyprus 4.123 0.136 
2 Peru 3.919 0.195 
3 Korea, South 3.831 0.110 
4 Sri Lanka 3.824 0.178 
5 Finland 3.815 0.204 
6 Mexico 3.506 0.152 
7 Israel 3.487 0.148 
8 South Africa 3.456 0.139 
9 Brazil 3.452 0.141 
10 Japan 3.384 0.176 
11 Turkey 3.383 0.190 
12 India 3.341 0.109 
13 Italy 3.228 0.177 
14 Australia 3.193 0.133 
15 France 3.168 0.099 
16 Norway * 3.124 0.148 
17 United Kingdom 3.117 0.120 
18 Sweden 3.097 0.127 
19 Malaysia 3.075 0.100 
20 Belgium 3.061 0.137 
21 Canada 3.042 0.115 
22 Netherlands 3.004 0.116 
23 Taiwan 2.981 0.171 
24 New Zealand 2.955 0.122 
25 Philippines 2.945 0.078 
26 Ireland 2.820 0.136 
27 Austria 2.808 0.182 
28 United States 2.804 0.122 
29 Singapore 2.802 0.125 
30 Denmark * 2.643 0.130 
31 China 2.575 0.132 
32 Germany 2.448 0.169 
33 Switzerland 1.631 0.174 
 
Notes: Indices range from 1 to 7, with 1 corresponding to conditions most favorable towards businesses and 
employers, and 7 corresponding to conditions most favorable towards workers. A * denotes those countries for 
which the rwg statistic was less than 0.7 for the relevant subset of questions. Details of the calibration procedure are 
in Section 3. The “Std Dev” column lists an upper bound of the standard deviation for the reported mean, taking into 
account possible covariances between variables. 
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TABLE 5 (continued): Indices of Labor Market and Workplace Conditions  
 
Module 2 (excl qn 2.10) 
Labor Market Conditions  
 
 Country Mean Std Dev 
1 Finland 5.714 0.187 
2 Netherlands 5.378 0.169 
3 Sweden 5.345 0.129 
4 Norway 5.207 0.166 
5 Belgium 5.099 0.214 
6 Germany 5.024 0.218 
7 Austria 5.001 0.195 
8 Denmark 4.952 0.151 
9 France 4.855 0.177 
10 Japan 4.690 0.169 
11 Singapore 4.670 0.176 
12 Italy 4.655 0.201 
13 New Zealand 4.653 0.142 
14 Australia 4.558 0.146 
15 Canada 4.497 0.138 
16 United Kingdom 4.441 0.145 
17 Cyprus 4.429 0.179 
18 South Africa 4.359 0.197 
19 Ireland 4.261 0.169 
20 Israel 4.241 0.202 
21 Switzerland 4.241 0.194 
22 Malaysia 4.227 0.153 
23 Korea, South 4.138 0.129 
24 United States 4.061 0.150 
25 Taiwan * 3.886 0.154 
26 Philippines 3.837 0.175 
27 China 3.823 0.123 
28 India 3.788 0.153 
29 Brazil 3.581 0.178 
30 Sri Lanka 3.568 0.168 
31 Turkey 3.412 0.198 
32 Mexico 3.153 0.185 
33 Peru 2.773 0.166 
 
Module 3 (excl qn 3.01 & 3.08) 
Freedom of Association &  
Collective Bargaining 
 Country Mean Std Dev 
1 Finland 6.005 0.157 
2 Germany 5.884 0.194 
3 Netherlands 5.810 0.153 
4 Belgium 5.699 0.181 
5 Sweden 5.676 0.123 
6 Norway 5.504 0.152 
7 Denmark 5.497 0.139 
8 France 5.260 0.170 
9 Switzerland 5.251 0.153 
10 Austria 5.237 0.202 
11 Japan 5.189 0.174 
12 Italy 5.113 0.212 
13 South Africa 5.053 0.175 
14 Israel 5.001 0.184 
15 Canada 4.867 0.139 
16 New Zealand 4.800 0.143 
17 Australia 4.717 0.141 
18 Ireland 4.640 0.175 
19 Korea, South 4.472 0.119 
20 United Kingdom 4.461 0.140 
21 Cyprus 4.220 0.156 
22 United States 4.208 0.148 
23 Brazil 4.079 0.148 
24 Philippines 4.067 0.149 
25 Malaysia 3.903 0.141 
26 Peru 3.877 0.151 
27 India 3.831 0.125 
28 Singapore 3.796 0.147 
29 Taiwan 3.496 0.150 
30 Sri Lanka 3.486 0.184 
31 Turkey 3.378 0.186 
32 Mexico 3.239 0.174 
33 China * 3.093 0.122 
 
Notes: Indices range from 1 to 7, with 1 corresponding to conditions most favorable towards businesses and 
employers, and 7 corresponding to conditions most favorable towards workers. A * denotes those countries for 
which the rwg statistic was less than 0.7 for the relevant subset of questions. Details of the calibration procedure are 
in Section 3. The “Std Dev” column lists an upper bound of the standard deviation for the reported mean, taking into 
account possible covariances between variables. 
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TABLE 5 (continued): Indices of Labor Market and Workplace Conditions  
 
Module 4 
Labor Disputes 
 
 Country Mean Std Dev 
1 France 5.128 0.138 
2 Belgium 5.095 0.171 
3 Italy 5.075 0.192 
4 Finland 4.664 0.203 
5 Denmark 4.633 0.136 
6 Netherlands 4.561 0.149 
7 Austria 4.558 0.201 
8 Norway 4.535 0.145 
9 South Africa 4.381 0.167 
10 Ireland 4.363 0.151 
11 Israel 4.355 0.150 
12 Sweden 4.293 0.128 
13 Cyprus 4.202 0.171 
14 Peru 4.161 0.162 
15 Korea, South 4.123 0.133 
16 Philippines 4.026 0.160 
17 Switzerland 4.008 0.155 
18 Australia 3.996 0.128 
19 Japan 3.978 0.165 
20 India 3.871 0.147 
21 New Zealand 3.848 0.129 
22 United Kingdom 3.811 0.123 
23 Canada 3.805 0.118 
24 Brazil 3.719 0.191 
25 Germany 3.697 0.181 
26 China 3.617 0.133 
27 Malaysia 3.612 0.150 
28 Mexico 3.481 0.157 
29 Sri Lanka 3.458 0.161 
30 United States 3.294 0.124 
31 Taiwan 3.113 0.149 
32 Singapore 3.071 0.190 
33 Turkey 2.715 0.165 
 
Module 5 
Employment Regulations &  
Working Conditions 
 Country Mean Std Dev 
1 Sweden 6.102 0.157 
2 Belgium 6.100 0.261 
3 Finland 6.019 0.198 
4 Netherlands 6.014 0.206 
5 Italy 5.933 0.226 
6 Germany 5.914 0.257 
7 Norway 5.888 0.199 
8 France 5.882 0.249 
9 Cyprus 5.730 0.158 
10 Denmark 5.684 0.211 
11 Austria 5.533 0.232 
12 Israel 5.298 0.241 
13 Ireland 5.273 0.213 
14 South Africa 5.258 0.237 
15 Australia 5.145 0.199 
16 New Zealand 5.142 0.173 
17 Canada 5.107 0.182 
18 Japan 4.940 0.196 
19 India 4.937 0.184 
20 Singapore 4.851 0.215 
21 Brazil 4.816 0.194 
22 Switzerland 4.719 0.243 
23 Korea, South 4.653 0.142 
24 United Kingdom 4.640 0.194 
25 Malaysia 4.605 0.165 
26 Philippines 4.579 0.194 
27 Turkey 4.428 0.277 
28 Sri Lanka 4.228 0.210 
29 Peru 4.021 0.194 
30 Mexico 4.011 0.229 
31 China 4.008 0.133 
32 United States 3.999 0.192 
33 Taiwan * 3.856 0.159 
 
Notes: Indices range from 1 to 7, with 1 corresponding to conditions most favorable towards businesses and 
employers, and 7 corresponding to conditions most favorable towards workers. A * denotes those countries for 
which the rwg statistic was less than 0.7 for the relevant subset of questions. Details of the calibration procedure are 
in Section 3. The “Std Dev” column lists an upper bound of the standard deviation for the reported mean, taking into 
account possible covariances between variables. 
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TABLE 5 (continued): Indices of Labor Market and Workplace Conditions 
 
Module 6 
Employee Benefits 
 
 Country Mean Std Dev 
1 Netherlands 5.808 0.132 
2 Sweden 5.788 0.102 
3 Norway 5.613 0.146 
4 Denmark 5.557 0.124 
5 Finland 5.446 0.177 
6 Switzerland 5.377 0.178 
7 Belgium 5.177 0.191 
8 Germany 5.062 0.180 
9 France 5.021 0.170 
10 Austria 4.972 0.176 
11 Israel 4.900 0.168 
12 Taiwan * 4.892 0.150 
13 Japan 4.865 0.151 
14 Cyprus 4.843 0.177 
15 New Zealand 4.484 0.136 
16 Italy 4.383 0.184 
17 Australia 4.284 0.131 
18 Canada 4.272 0.126 
19 Malaysia 4.127 0.181 
20 United Kingdom 4.055 0.131 
21 Ireland 4.055 0.155 
22 Korea, South 3.716 0.134 
23 Peru 3.445 0.145 
24 Brazil 3.232 0.161 
25 China 3.179 0.114 
26 Turkey 3.103 0.161 
27 India 3.067 0.143 
28 United States 3.065 0.133 
29 South Africa 3.026 0.186 
30 Philippines 2.871 0.196 
31 Mexico 2.600 0.150 
32 Singapore 2.225 0.147 
33 Sri Lanka 2.224 0.172 
 
Question 2.10 
% of workers in informal sector 
 
 Country Mean Std Dev 
1 India * 3.884 0.061 
2 Philippines * 3.767 0.073 
3 Peru 3.727 0.099 
4 Sri Lanka 3.376 0.047 
5 Brazil 3.001 0.102 
6 Taiwan * 2.947 0.061 
7 Mexico 2.887 0.048 
8 Turkey * 2.780 0.072 
9 China * 2.640 0.038 
10 Korea, South * 2.610 0.052 
11 Switzerland * 2.499 0.081 
12 South Africa 2.223 0.066 
13 Canada * 1.863 0.041 
14 Ireland * 1.845 0.045 
15 Italy 1.830 0.087 
16 Austria 1.753 0.077 
17 Malaysia 1.742 0.054 
18 Singapore 1.737 0.094 
19 United States * 1.722 0.040 
20 Australia 1.586 0.051 
21 New Zealand 1.579 0.052 
22 United Kingdom 1.484 0.045 
23 Japan 1.444 0.089 
24 Sweden 1.386 0.055 
25 Denmark 1.378 0.046 
26 Cyprus 1.266 0.091 
27 Germany 1.266 0.057 
28 Norway 1.266 0.052 
29 Israel 1.231 0.049 
30 Netherlands 1.231 0.043 
31 Finland 1.144 0.069 
32 Belgium 1.116 0.066 
33 France 1.102 0.038 
 
Notes: Indices range from 1 to 7, with 1 corresponding to conditions most favorable towards businesses and 
employers, and 7 corresponding to conditions most favorable towards workers. For questions seeking a quantitative 
estimate, scores were coded from a 1 for an estimate of 0-20%, to 5 for an estimate of 81-100%. A * denotes those 
countries for which the rwg statistic was less than 0.7 for the relevant subset of questions. Details of the calibration 
procedure are in Section 3. The “Std Dev” column lists an upper bound of the standard deviation for the reported 
mean, taking into account possible covariances between variables. 
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TABLE 5 (continued): Indices of Labor Market and Workplace Conditions 
 
Question 3.01 
% of workers who are labor union 
members 
 Country Mean Std Dev 
1 Sweden 4.922 0.034 
2 Denmark 4.791 0.042 
3 Finland 4.344 0.061 
4 Belgium 3.681 0.038 
5 Cyprus 3.523 0.075 
6 Norway 3.306 0.040 
7 China * 3.096 0.043 
8 Austria 2.963 0.052 
9 South Africa * 2.740 0.045 
10 Ireland 2.553 0.051 
11 Switzerland 2.365 0.062 
12 Israel 2.348 0.040 
13 Canada 2.309 0.042 
14 United Kingdom 2.294 0.042 
15 Australia 2.253 0.042 
16 Germany 2.252 0.044 
17 Italy 2.223 0.057 
18 Netherlands 2.174 0.038 
19 New Zealand 2.151 0.043 
20 India * 1.947 0.054 
21 Sri Lanka * 1.936 0.066 
22 Brazil * 1.933 0.098 
23 Mexico 1.891 0.051 
24 Taiwan 1.863 0.051 
25 Japan * 1.791 0.054 
26 Singapore 1.697 0.067 
27 United States 1.394 0.042 
28 Philippines 1.296 0.045 
29 Turkey 1.251 0.054 
30 France 1.200 0.050 
31 Peru 1.150 0.067 
32 Korea, South 1.061 0.045 
33 Malaysia 1.054 0.059 
 
Question 3.08 
% of labor force covered by a collective 
bargaining agreement 
 Country Mean Std Dev 
1 Sweden 4.983 0.047 
2 Finland 4.731 0.047 
3 Belgium 4.715 0.075 
4 Austria 4.413 0.086 
5 Netherlands 4.253 0.047 
6 Denmark 4.229 0.040 
7 France 4.114 0.077 
8 Italy * 3.816 0.085 
9 Norway * 3.755 0.056 
10 Germany 3.644 0.053 
11 Switzerland * 3.609 0.093 
12 Cyprus 3.505 0.055 
13 Ireland * 3.447 0.076 
14 Australia * 2.826 0.058 
15 South Africa * 2.706 0.071 
16 Israel 2.604 0.059 
17 United Kingdom * 2.368 0.061 
18 Canada 2.312 0.059 
19 Brazil * 2.154 0.063 
20 New Zealand 1.801 0.054 
21 Mexico * 1.746 0.052 
22 India * 1.735 0.049 
23 Singapore * 1.689 0.062 
24 Japan 1.486 0.068 
25 China 1.459 0.041 
26 Sri Lanka 1.445 0.103 
27 United States 1.390 0.065 
28 Taiwan 1.323 0.054 
29 Philippines 1.283 0.065 
30 Turkey 1.205 0.061 
31 Peru 1.086 0.089 
32 Malaysia 0.957 0.043 
33 Korea, South 0.867 0.054 
 
Notes: Indices range from 1 to 5, ranging from a 1 for an estimate of 0-20%, to 5 for an estimate of 81-100%. A * 
denotes those countries for which the rwg statistic was less than 0.7 for the relevant subset of questions. Details of the 
calibration procedure are in Section 3. The “Std Dev” column lists an upper bound of the standard deviation for the 
reported mean, taking into account possible covariances between variables. 
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TABLE 6: Estimated Effect of Respondent Orientation on their Perception of Labor Conditions in their Country 
 
 Coefficient (Standard Error) 
 
Module 1a Module 1b Module 2 Module 3 Module 4 Module 5 Module 6 
 General 
Economic 
Situation 
Role of IMF & 
World Bank 
Labor Market 
Conditions 
Freedom of 
Association & 
Collective 
Bargaining 
Labor Disputes Employment 
Regulations & 
Working 
Conditions 
Employee 
Benefits 
Respondent Orientation        
7.01: Political orientation 
(right-wing vs left-wing) 
0.06 (0.06) -0.03** (0.01) 0.02 (0.03) 0.02 (0.03) -0.01 (0.01) -0.02 (0.02) 0.01 (0.04) 
7.02: Role of government in 
economic policy-making 
-0.03 (0.04) 0.01 (0.01) -0.01 (0.02) 0.00 (0.02) 0.01 (0.01) 0.02 (0.02) -0.01 (0.03) 
7.03: State responsibility for 
workers’ living standards 
0.03*** (0.01) 0.01 (0.00) 0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 0.02 (0.01) 0.03 (0.02) 
7.04: Labor clauses in trade 
agreements  
-0.00 (0.03) -0.02* (0.01) 0.00 (0.01) 0.01 (0.02) -0.01 (0.01) -0.02 (0.02) -0.02 (0.03) 
 
       
Occupation 
 
      
Corporate official 
-0.03 (0.23) 0.09 (0.10) 0.05 (0.09) 0.06 (0.13) 0.22** (0.09) 0.20 (0.14) 0.05 (0.21) 
Government official  
-0.15 (0.20) 0.16** (0.06) -0.12 (0.14) -0.09 (0.12) 0.10 (0.08) 0.02 (0.14) -0.08 (0.17) 
Independent lawyer / arbitrator 
-0.49 (0.29) 0.20** (0.08) -0.31 (0.19) -0.18 (0.13) 0.01 (0.07) -0.14 (0.13) -0.20 (0.19) 
Journalist / Reporter 
-0.18 (0.18) 0.02 (0.06) -0.02 (0.10) 0.01 (0.11) 0.01 (0.10) -0.02 (0.13) -0.15 (0.17) 
Labor activist 0.03 (0.12) -0.05 (0.04) -0.03 (0.07) -0.07 (0.11) -0.12* (0.06) -0.15 (0.13) -0.18 (0.15) 
Labor union official  0.11 (0.11) -0.04 (0.04) 0.00 (0.07) -0.04 (0.09) -0.09 (0.05) -0.08 (0.10) -0.09 (0.12) 
Other 
-0.04 (0.12) -0.03 (0.04) -0.06 (0.07) -0.09 (0.10) -0.12** (0.06) -0.16 (0.12) -0.22 (0.14) 
Occupation = NA 
-0.07 (0.15) 0.04 (0.05) -0.01 (0.09) -0.02 (0.10) 0.02 (0.08) 0.04 (0.10) -0.08 (0.16) 
Omitted Group = Academic 
       
 
       
Dummy = 1 if NOT 
Labourstart correspondent 
-0.09 (0.07) -0.05** (0.02) -0.04 (0.03) -0.02 (0.05) -0.07* (0.04) -0.09 (0.07) -0.12 (0.08) 
        
R-squared 0.05 0.10 0.03 0.02 0.05 0.03 0.02 
 
Notes: N= 1415 for all regressions. Additional controls include dummy variables for years of experience, and a dummy for not replying to the Labourstart 
correspondent question. Standard errors are clustered by country. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.
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TABLE 7: Correlation Matrix for GLS Labor Market Indices 
 
Correlation coefficient and Spearman rank correlation among the labor market indices 
 
Correlation coefficient 
Spearman’s rho 
Role of IMF 
& World 
Bank 
Labor 
Market 
Conditions 
Freedom of 
Association 
& Collective 
Bargaining  
Labor 
Disputes 
Employment 
Regulations 
& Working 
Conditions 
Employee 
Benefits 
% informal 
sector 
% labor 
union 
% collective 
bargaining  
Personal 
Views & 
Positions 
General Economic 
Situation 
-0.3500** 
-0.3165* 
0.8249*** 
0.7834*** 
0.6616*** 
0.6902*** 
0.3520** 
0.3827** 
0.6023*** 
0.6197*** 
0.8271*** 
0.8392*** 
-0.8022*** 
-0.6949*** 
0.5629*** 
0.6026*** 
0.6223*** 
0.6521*** 
0.1413 
0.1664 
Role of IMF & World 
Bank  
-0.2399 
-0.2737 
-0.2153 
-0.1735 
0.0661 
0.1183 
-0.0305 
-0.0094 
-0.2423 
-0.2119 
0.1568 
0.1103 
-0.0916 
-0.1735 
-0.2108 
-0.1735 
-0.3019* 
-0.2136 
Labor Market Conditions  
 
  
0.8557*** 
0.8740*** 
0.5692*** 
0.6063*** 
0.8485*** 
0.8593*** 
0.7453*** 
0.7707*** 
-0.8305*** 
-0.8419*** 
0.6023*** 
0.5428*** 
0.7780*** 
0.8018*** 
0.1984 
0.1708 
Freedom of Association & 
Collective Bargaining    
0.7293*** 
0.7403*** 
0.8618*** 
0.8626*** 
0.8040*** 
0.8352*** 
-0.7134*** 
-0.7607*** 
0.5295*** 
0.5334*** 
0.8173*** 
0.8215*** 
0.3826** 
0.2858 
Labor Disputes 
 
    
0.7575*** 
0.7737*** 
0.5978*** 
0.6103*** 
-0.4529*** 
-0.5311*** 
0.4521*** 
0.4923*** 
0.7414*** 
0.7283*** 
0.2298 
0.1454 
Employment Regulations 
& Working Conditions      
0.7067*** 
0.7223*** 
-0.7107*** 
-0.7483*** 
0.5977*** 
0.6120*** 
0.8755*** 
0.8810*** 
0.2203 
0.1604 
Employee Benefits 
 
      
-0.6836*** 
-0.7296*** 
0.5580*** 
0.5291*** 
0.7446*** 
0.7366*** 
0.1957 
0.1631 
% informal sector 
 
       
-0.4670*** 
-0.4365** 
-0.6478*** 
-0.6838*** 
-0.2874 
-0.1581 
% labor union 
 
        
0.7403*** 
0.7660*** 
-0.0195 
0.1143 
% collective bargaining 
 
         
0.2270 
0.2283 
 
Notes: In each cell, the first figure is the correlation coefficient between the two indices, while the second figure is the Spearman rho rank correlation statistic. *, 
**, and *** denote p-values significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively for tests against the null hypothesis that the indices are independent. 
Calibrated indices are used except for “Personal Views & Positions”, where the mean of responses from each country across the Module 7 questions is used.   
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TABLE 8: Consistency of GLS Indices with Measures of the Regulation of Labor 
 
Correlation coefficient and Spearman rank correlation among the labor market indices 
 
Correlation coefficient 
Spearman’s rho 
General 
Economic 
Situation 
Role of IMF 
& World 
Bank 
Labor 
Market 
Conditions 
Freedom of 
Association & 
Collective 
Bargaining  
Labor 
Disputes 
Employment 
Regulations 
& Working 
Conditions 
Employee 
Benefits 
% informal 
sector 
% labor 
union 
% collective 
bargaining  
Botero et al. (2004):           
Employment laws 
index 
0.1408 
0.1924 
0.0360          
0.0726 
0.3376* 
0.3515** 
0.3966**       
0.4450** 
0.4640*** 
0.4901*** 
0.5196*** 
0.4813*** 
0.3945** 
0.4472** 
-0.0976       
-0.2111 
0.4019** 
0.2676 
0.6363*** 
0.5704*** 
Collective relations 
laws index 
-0.2174      
-0.1560   
0.2417       
0.3295* 
-0.0618 
0.0506 
0.1801 
0.2055 
0.3464* 
0.3615** 
0.2145  
0.2262 
0.0525 
0.0541 
0.1368      
0.0374 
-0.0619      
-0.1239    
0.1688 
0.1155 
Social security laws 
index 
0.6178*** 
0.6488*** 
-0.3690**   
-0.2804 
0.5556*** 
0.5279*** 
0.5882*** 
0.5620*** 
0.4494*** 
0.4476** 
0.4725*** 
0.4666*** 
0.6802*** 
0.6943*** 
-0.5618*** 
-0.5121***   
0.5529*** 
0.6312*** 
0.5885*** 
0.5883***    
% Employment in the 
unofficial economy        
0.7591***
0.6703***   
Union Density (ILO) 
        
0.8240*** 
0.7584***  
Right to collective 
bargaining          
-0.1152        
-0.1605 
Doing Business: Rigidity 
of Employment Index 
-0.4779*** 
-0.4001** 
0.3987** 
0.4748*** 
-0.2783 
-0.2212 
-0.0889 
-0.0431 
0.1265 
0.1276 
0.0340 
0.0406 
-0.0873 
-0.0630 
0.3682**  
0.2593 
-0.0857      
-0.1507 
0.0991   
0.0604 
EFW: Labor Market 
Regulations 
-0.0812 
-0.0784 
-0.1546 
-0.1905 
-0.2092 
-0.2481 
-0.3253* 
-0.3306* 
-0.3345* 
-0.3713** 
-0.4189** 
-0.4212** 
-0.3650** 
-0.3746** 
0.1245 
0.1789 
-0.3704**   
-0.2937 
-0.4229**       
-0.3607**       
 
Notes: In each cell, the first figure is the correlation coefficient between the two indices, while the second figure is the Spearman rho rank correlation statistic. *, 
**, and *** denote p-values significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively for tests against the null hypothesis that the indices are independent.   
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TABLE 9: Summary Statistics of Labor Market Indices by Country Income Brackets 
 
 
 
General 
Economic 
Situation 
Role of IMF 
& World 
Bank 
Labor 
Market 
Conditions 
Freedom of 
Association 
& Collective 
Bargaining  
Labor 
Disputes 
Employment 
Regulations 
& Working 
Conditions 
Employee 
Benefits 
% informal 
sector 
% labor 
union 
% collective 
bargaining  
Mean: All 4.223 3.153 4.379 4.631 4.038 5.070 4.204 2.040 2.356 2.656 
Quartile 1 2.719 3.362 3.643 3.858 3.744 4.534 3.018 3.175 1.919 1.634 
Quartile 2 4.231 3.425 4.257 4.433 4.086 5.065 4.167 1.841 2.063 2.265 
Quartile 3 4.838 3.014 4.903 5.117 4.188 5.475 4.764 1.573 2.498 3.466 
Quartile 4 5.027 2.827 4.650 5.053 4.114 5.156 4.797 1.628 2.927 3.159 
Developing 2.980 3.392 3.696 3.862 3.742 4.504 3.145 2.967 1.759 1.513 
High-income  
non-OECD 4.677 3.348 4.307 4.128 3.685 4.934 4.215 1.795 2.358 2.280 
OECD 4.881 2.963 4.813 5.212 4.297 5.446 4.849 1.527 2.720 3.439 
Median: All 4.628 3.117 4.429 4.717 4.008 5.107 4.284 1.742 2.223 2.368 
Quartile 1 2.627 3.418 3.684 3.854 3.795 4.503 3.085 3.189 1.934 1.452 
Quartile 2 4.423 3.357 4.335 4.594 4.059 5.143 4.334 1.664 2.187 2.203 
Quartile 3 4.802 3.004 5.001 5.260 4.558 5.882 5.021 1.266 2.252 4.114 
Quartile 4 5.066 2.958 4.566 5.220 4.151 5.106 5.121 1.464 2.459 3.528 
Developing 2.682 3.452 3.788 3.877 3.719 4.579 3.103 2.887 1.891 1.445 
High-income  
non-OECD 4.704 3.234 4.335 4.008 3.657 5.074 4.807 1.502 2.106 2.146 
OECD 4.856 3.051 4.772 5.244 4.328 5.608 4.997 1.464 2.301 3.700 
Standard 
Deviation: All 1.046 0.477 0.661 0.828 0.573 0.697 1.058 0.835 0.998 1.279 
Notes: Summary statistics in bold are for the sample of 33 countries. Countries are sorted into quartiles based on the observed distribution of mean real GDP per 
capita (in constant 2000 US$) for the years 2001-2003, taken from the World Development Indicators (WDI), with Quartile 1 corresponding to the lowest income 
quartile etc. The sorting of countries into Developing, High-income non-OECD and OECD countries is based on the World Bank’s classifications; there were 11, 
4, and 18 countries in these respective categories. Although the WDI does not report income data for Taiwan, we placed Taiwan in Quartile 3 and classified it as 
a high-income non-OECD country, together with Singapore, given that the CIA World Factbook estimates PPP-adjusted real GDP per capita between Taiwan 
and Singapore in 2004 to be very similar (US$23,400 for Taiwan and US$23,700 for Singapore). 
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TABLE 10: OLS Regressions between GLS Indices and Outcome Variables 
 
Dependent Variable: ln(Mean real GDP per capita, 2001-2003) ln(GINI coefficient) 
Mean growth rate of real GDP 
per capita, 2000-2003 Unemployment rate, 2001 
Additional controls:   ln(Real GDP per capita, 2000) ln(Real GDP per capita, 2001) 
 Coefficient R2 Coefficient R2 Coefficient R2 Coefficient R2 
General Economic Situation 
0.971***     
(0.117) 
0.65 -0.122***    
(0.032) 
0.37 
 
1.082**       
(0.455) 
0.32 -2.294          
(1.548) 
0.19 
Role of IMF & World Bank 
-0.821**       
(0.396) 
0.10 0.081           
(0.108) 
0.02 
 
-0.228          
(0.850) 
0.17 1.743            
(1.255) 
0.13 
 
Labor Market Conditions 
1.340***      
(0.230) 
0.49 -0.172***     
(0.038) 
0.30 
 
0.724           
(0.523) 
0.21 2.336           
(1.851) 
0.16 
 
Freedom of Association & 
Collective Bargaining 
1.106***     
(0.189) 
0.51 -0.112***    
(0.038) 
0.20 
 
-0.052          
(0.514) 
0.17 4.071*          
(2.040) 
0.34 
 
Labor Disputes 
0.832***      
(0.300) 
0.13 -0.113**       
(0.052) 
0.10 
 
0.473             
(0.387) 
0.19 2.773*         
(1.550) 
0.20 
 
Employment Regulations & 
Working Conditions 
1.040***      
(0.267) 
0.31 -0.125***    
(0.044) 
0.17 
 
0.082           
(0.408) 
0.17 3.111*          
(1.669) 
0.23 
 
Employee Benefits 
0.821***      
(0.189) 
0.48 -0.109***    
(0.034) 
0.30 
 
0.309           
(0.336) 
0.19 -0.041          
(0.759) 
0.11 
 
% informal sector 
-1.282***    
(0.127) 
0.71 0.097**       
(0.045) 
0.15 
 
-0.596          
(0.744) 
0.19 -2.090          
(2.070) 
0.14 
 
% labor union 
0.423***      
(0.148) 
0.11 -0.080***    
(0.026) 
0.15 
 
0.416           
(0.291) 
0.22 0.474           
(0.808) 
0.11 
 
% collective bargaining 
0.576***      
(0.132) 
0.34 -0.077***    
(0.020) 
0.21 
 
0.033           
(0.220) 
0.17 1.026           
(0.668) 
0.15 
 
 
Notes: Separate regressions are run for each dependent variable and each labor market index in turn. The coefficients on the labor market variables, robust 
standard errors and R2 values are reported. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. The number of observations for the 
regressions on income and the growth rate is 32, with Taiwan dropping out because of missing income data. The number of observations for the regressions on 
inequality is 29, with Austria, Cyprus, Israel and Switzerland dropping out because of missing inequality data. The number of observations for the regressions on 
the unemployment rate is 31, due to missing unemployment data from India and Taiwan.  
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FIGURE 1: Comparison of Percentage Estimates from the GLS and Botero et al. (2004) 
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APPENDIX TABLE 1: GLS Survey Questions 
 
For most of Modules 1 through 7, unless otherwise indicated, questions sought a response on a scale of 1 to 7 spanning the two polar opposite answer 
options provided. Interested readers are directed to the GLS website at http://gls.law.harvard.edu for a firsthand look at the survey instrument.   
 
 Survey question Response options 
 Module 0: Respondent Information  
0.01 Please identify the country on which you are reporting.  Pull-down list of countries provided.  
0.02 How many years have you been studying or participating in the labor relations 
of your country of expertise?   
Less than 1 year ; 1 to 5 years ; 5 to 10 years ; More than 10 years 
0.03 How would you best describe yourself?   
 
Academic ; Corporate official ; Government official ;                        
Independent lawyer/arbitrator ; Journalist/Reporter ; Labor activist ;           
Labor union official ; Other 
0.04 Are you a Labourstart correspondent?   Yes ; No 
 Module 1: The General Economic Situation  
1.01 In 2004, your economy has so far   1 = Been in a recession                                                                                 
7 = Been strong 
1.02 The level of unemployment in your country is currently   1 = High and a major social and economic problem                                      
7 = Low and not a major social or economic problem 
1.03 The rate of poverty in your country is currently   1 = High and a major social and economic problem                                       
7 = Low and not a major social or economic problem 
1.04 The difference in the quality of healthcare available to rich and poor people in 
your country is   
1 = Large                                                                                                         
7 = Small 
1.05 The difference in the educational opportunities available to children from rich 
and poor families in your country is   
1 = Large                                                                                                         
7 = Small 
1.06 The quality of public schools in your country is   1 = Very bad                                                                                                   
7 = Equal to the best in the world  
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1.07 Workers in your country are   1 = Poorly equipped to work in modern industry                                           
7 = Equal to the best in the world at working in modern industry 
1.08 Talented people from your country typically   1 = Seek opportunities to work abroad                                                           
7 = Remain and work in your country 
1.09 The role of foreign trade in your country’s economy is   1 = Limited or negligible                                                                                   
7 = Sizeable  
1.10 To what extent do World Bank and International Monetary Fund policies 
influence economic decision-making in your country?   
1 = No influence on policy                                                                                
7 = Large influence on policy  
1.11 Based on your experience, the World Bank’s actions in your country have 
primarily helped the interests of   
1 = The business sector                                                                                     
7 = Workers 
1.12 Based on your experience, the International Monetary Fund’s actions in your 
country have primarily helped the interests of   
1 = The business sector                                                                                      
7 = Workers 
 Module 2: The Labor Market  
2.01 Hiring decisions in the PRIVATE sector of your country are based mainly on 1 = Personal connections                                                                               
7 = Workers’ skills, education or experience 
2.02 Hiring decisions in the PUBLIC or GOVERNMENT sector of your country are 
based mainly on  
1 = Personal connections                                                                              
7 = Workers’ skills, education or experience 
2.03 The minimum wage in your country is 1 = Evaded by firms                                                                                        
7 = Effectively enforced by the state or labor organizations 
2.04 Workers’ pay levels in your country are  1 = Flexible and can be easily changed or re-negotiated                                  
7 = Rigid and cannot be easily changed or re-negotiated 
2.05 Pay in your country is  1 = Strongly related to worker productivity                                                     
7 = Not related to worker productivity 
2.06 How often do workers in your country fail to receive the full amount of the 
REGULAR wages that they are supposed to be paid?  
1 = Such problems are a regular occurrence                                                       
7 = Such problems are a rare occurrence 
2.07 How often do workers in your country fail to receive the full amount of the 
OVERTIME wages that they are supposed to be paid? 
1 = Such problems are a regular occurrence                                                      
7 = Such problems are a rare occurrence 
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2.08 The effect that globalization and trade have had on unskilled workers in your 
country has been 
1 = Generally negative                                                                                      
7 = Generally positive 
2.09 To what extent is the government in your country seeking to privatize traditional 
public sector jobs? 
1 = Not privatizing much                                                                               
7 = Aggressively privatizing 
 For questions 2.10, 2.11 and 2.12, the INFORMAL sector refers to workers who 
fall beyond the effective jurisdiction of labor and tax laws, either because they 
are self-employed or work for unofficial/unregistered businesses.  
 
2.10 To your best knowledge, what percentage of workers in your country work in 
the INFORMAL sector? (PLEASE MARK ONE BOX ONLY) 
0-20% ;  21-40% ; 41-60% ; 61-80% ;  81-100% 
2.11 The rights of workers in the INFORMAL sector 1 = Receive little attention from the state or labor organizations                     
7 = Are effectively protected by the state or labor organizations 
2.12 Wages in the FORMAL sector of your country are 1 = Set by individual companies that operate under market forces                   
7 = Set by a centralized bargaining process or by government statute 
2.13 Child labor or the employment of minors is 1 = A common and widespread practice                                                         
7 = Effectively prohibited 
2.14 Discrimination on the basis of gender in the workplace is 1 = A common and widespread practice                                                         
7 = Effectively prohibited 
2.15 Discrimination on the basis of race or ethnicity in the workplace is 1 = A common and widespread practice                                                         
7 = Effectively prohibited 
 Module 3: Freedom of Association & Collective Bargaining  
3.01 To your best knowledge, what percentage of workers in your country are 
officially members of a labor union? (PLEASE MARK ONE BOX ONLY) 
0-20% ;  21-40% ; 41-60% ; 61-80% ;  81-100% 
3.02 Labor unions in your country are  1 = Under the control of the state or political parties                                         
7 = Independent organizations 
3.03 Protection of the right to form a union in your country is  1 = Weak or non-existent                                                                                
7 = Equal to the world’s most stringent 
3.04 Arrests or attacks on labor leaders because of their union activity are  1 = Frequent                                                                                                        
7 = Rare or non-existent 
3.05 In a unionized firm, are new employees allowed to choose whether they want to 1 = Yes, employees have full personal choice                                                   
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join a labor union?  7 = No, union membership is effectively mandatory in workplaces                      
       where a union is present 
3.06 The involvement of labor unions in politics in your country is  1 = Minimal or non-existent                                                                     
7 = Frequent and substantial 
3.07 Labor unions in your country are generally  1 = Ineffective in protecting and advancing the interests of workers       
7 = Effective in protecting and advancing the interests of workers 
3.08 To your best knowledge, what percentage of the labor force is covered by a 
collective bargaining agreement? (PLEASE MARK ONE BOX ONLY) 
0-20% ;  21-40% ; 41-60% ; 61-80% ;  81-100% 
3.09 Unions conduct negotiations with employers  1 = Under government influence or pressure                                            
7 = Freely and independently of the government 
3.10 In the process of determining wages in your country, labor unions  1 = Are usually bypassed by employers                                                   
7 = Are very influential and powerful 
3.11 The extension of collective bargaining contracts to non-union firms is 1 = Not legislated                                                                             
7 = Required and enforced by regulations 
3.12 Workers’ participation in the management of companies (through such bodies as 
workers’ councils) is 
1 = Determined by employers                                                                   
7 = Effectively enforced by the state or labor organizations 
3.13 In practice, workers’ opinions and suggestions on the management of companies  1 = Are usually bypassed by employers                                                     
7 = Are very powerful in influencing management decisions 
 Module 4: Labor Disputes  
4.01 Labor-employer relations in your country are generally 1 = Cooperative                                                                                         
7 = Confrontational 
4.02 The population of your country at large generally  1 = Does not support or care about labor unions                                       
7 = Supports labor unions on the issues they raise 
4.03 In your country, the threat of strikes is  1 = Ineffective in increasing the bargaining power of labor unions and  
       workers                                                                                   
7 = Very effective in increasing the bargaining power of labor unions  
       and workers 
 
4.04 
 
In the event of a strike, non-union workers  
 
1 = Rarely or never join in the strike                                                          
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7 = Often support union workers by participating in the strike 
4.05 In your country, wildcat strikes (strikes that are not authorized by a formal labor 
union) are  
1 = Rare or non-existent                                                                            
7 = A common occurrence 
4.06 In your country, political strikes (strikes for political reasons or in protest of 
government policies) are  
1 = Rare or non-existent                                                                            
7 = A common occurrence   
4.07 Procedures requiring a waiting period or notification prior to conducting a strike 
are 
1 = Required and enforced by regulations                                                
7 = Non-existent or typically ignored by workers or labor unions 
4.08 In the event of a strike, how often do employers resort to hiring replacement 
workers?  
1 = Frequently                                                                                            
7 = Rarely 
4.09 In the event of a labor dispute, how often do employers resort to lockouts to 
place pressure on workers?  
1 = Frequently                                                                                            
7 = Rarely 
4.10 When workers fail to receive the full amount of their wages, how likely are they 
to obtain full repayment through courts or other administrative agencies?  
1 = Very unlikely to receive their full pay                                                
7 = Very likely that a full resolution will be reached 
4.11 The role of third-party mediation (such as labor arbitration courts) in resolving 
labor disputes is  
1 = Non-existent or very limited                                                                
7 = Effective in resolving most disputes 
4.12 Tripartite forums (involving labor, employers and the government) to help 
resolve labor disputes are 
1 = Non-existent or rarely used                                                                 
7 = Often used to resolve disputes 
 Module 5: Employment Regulations & Working Conditions  
5.01 The terms of contracts for hiring workers on a full-time basis are determined by 1 = Employers                                                                                           
7 = Regulations or collective bargaining 
5.02 The extension of the benefits enjoyed by full-time workers to part-time workers 
is determined by  
1 = Employers                                                                                           
7 = Regulations or collective bargaining 
5.03 Hiring of workers on fixed-term contracts (employment for only a fixed period 
of time) is  
1 = A common practice                                                                             
7 = Rare or non-existent 
5.04 Maximum hours of work in a regular workweek are determined by 1 = Employers                                                                                           
7 = Regulations or collective bargaining 
 
5.05 
 
The premium paid for overtime hours of work is determined by 
 
1 = Employers                                                                                           
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7 = Regulations or collective bargaining 
5.06 The number of days of paid vacation in a year for workers in FORMAL sector 
firms is determined by  
1 = Employers                                                                                           
7 = Regulations or collective bargaining 
5.07 Paid time off for national or local holidays is determined by 1 = Employers                                                                                           
7 = Regulations or collective bargaining 
5.08 In practice, regulations on work hours and workplace conditions are 1 = Ignored by employers                                                                         
7 = Generally enforced 
5.09 The labor standards and working conditions that foreign firms maintain in your 
country are  
1 = Worse than those in domestic or state-owned firms                    
7 = Better than those in domestic or state-owned firms 
5.10 Firing of workers in the FORMAL sector of your country is determined by 1 = Employers                                                                                           
7 = The state or labor organizations 
5.11 Workers who believe they have been unfairly laid off  1 = Have no effective means to try to get their jobs back                        
7 = Can effectively try to get their jobs back through administrative or 
       legal channels 
5.12 Do employers regularly notify a third party (such as a government agency or 
labor union) prior to a collective layoff of workers? 
1 = No, they never notify a third party                                                     
7 = Yes, they always notify a third party 
5.13 Do employers implement “seniority rules” when laying off workers, so that the 
newest hires are laid off first and senior workers laid off last? 
1 = No, such decisions are entirely up to employers                                 
7 = Yes, such seniority rules are always followed 
5.14 Severance payment terms for dismissing full-time workers are determined by 1 = Employers                                                                                            
7 = Regulations or collective bargaining 
5.15 Minimum health and safety standards in the formal sector are determined by 1 = Employers                                                                                            
7 = Regulations or collective bargaining 
 Module 6: Employee Benefits  
6.01 The current level of state-determined benefits or pension for old-age, retirement, 
disability and death in your country is 
1 = Insufficient to cover the needs of workers                                         
7 = Sufficient to cover the needs of workers 
6.02 In funding future social insurance pensions or retirement benefits, your country 1 = Faces a potential “pensions crisis”                                                     
7 = Has adequate funds to finance such future payments 
6.03 Private pensions programs are  1 = Rarely used or non-existent                                                                
7 = Widely used 
     
 52 
6.04 In your country, sickness and health benefits for workers are 1 = Determined in practice by employers                                                   
7 = Legally required and funded by tax revenues 
6.05 The current level of sickness and health benefits in your country is 1 = Insufficient to cover the needs of workers                                         
7 = Sufficient to cover the needs of workers 
6.06 In your country, unemployment benefits/unemployment insurance payments 
provided by employers for workers are determined by 
1 = Employers                                                                                            
7 = Regulations or collective bargaining 
6.07 The current level of unemployment benefits/unemployment insurance payments 
in your country is 
1 = Insufficient to cover the needs of workers                                          
7 = Sufficient to cover the needs of workers 
6.08 Overall, the current level of social welfare benefits in your country is 1 = Lower than what your country’s budgetary situation can afford       
7 = More than what your country’s budgetary situation can afford 
 Module 7: Concluding Questions  
7.01 On political issues, I would describe myself as  1 = Right-wing                                                                                          
7 = Left-wing 
7.02 Which of the following best describes your opinion about the proper role that 
governments should play in economic policy-making?  
1 = Governments should allow market forces to determine economic  
      outcomes  
7 = Governments should intervene when market forces fail to achieve  
      desired social outcomes 
7.03 In your opinion, who should bear the most of the responsibility for ensuring that 
workers have employment and receive a wage that supports a minimum standard 
of living?  
1 = Workers themselves                                                                             
7 = Employers or the state 
7.04 In your opinion, do you agree that international trade agreements should include 
clauses for global labor standards?  
1 = Strongly disagree                                                                                 
7 = Strongly agree 
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APPENDIX TABLE 2: Matching of Questions with the Global Competitiveness Report 
 
Subject World Economic Forum 2004 Question  In WEF 2002? GLS Qn match 
Growth outlook  2.01  Your country’s economy                                                                   
1 = Will likely be in recession in the next 12 months                                                                                     
7 = Will have strong growth in the next 12 months 
Yes  
Qn 2.01 
1.01 
Size of unofficial 
economy 
5.07  The share of business activity in your country that you would estimate to be 
unofficial or unregistered (including under-reported official revenue by registered firms) is: 
Less than 5% of businesses ; 6-10% ; 11-20% ; 21-30% ; 31-40% ; 41-50% ; 51-60% ;     
61-70% ; more than 70% 
Yes 
Qn 5.06 
2.10 
Quality of public 
schools 
7.01  The public (free) schools in your country are 
1 = Of poor quality       7 = Equal to the best in the world 
Yes  
Qn 7.01 
1.06 
Ease of hiring and 
firing 
7.02  The hiring and firing of workers is 
1 = Impeded by regulations       7 = Flexibly determined by employers 
Yes  
Qn 7.02 
5.01 
5.10 
Labor-employer 
relations 
7.03  Labor-employer relations in your country are 
1 = Generally confrontational       7 = Generally cooperative       
Yes 
Qn 7.03 
4.01 
Wage-setting 7.04  Wages in your country are 
1 = Set by a centralized bargaining process       7 = Up to each individual company 
Yes  
Qn 7.04 
2.12 
Pay-productivity 
relationship 
7.05  Pay in your country is   
1 = Not related to worker productivity       7 = Strongly related to worker productivity 
Yes 
Qn 7.05 
2.05 
Inequality in 
healthcare access 
7.10  The difference in the quality of the healthcare available to rich and poor people in 
your country  is 
1 = Large       7 = Small 
Yes 
Qn 7.06 
1.04 
Quality of workforce 7.11 The educational system in your country 
1 = Does not meet the needs of a competitive economy                                                         
7 = Meets of the needs of a competitive economy 
No 1.07 
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Retention of talent 7.15  Your country’s talented people 
1 = Normally leave to pursue opportunities in other countries                                                                         
7 = Almost always remain in your country 
Yes 
Qn 7.09 
1.08 
Gender discrimination 
in the workplace 
7.16  In your country, private sector employment of women is 
1 = Limited and usually takes place in less important jobs                                                                             
7 = Equal to that of men 
7.17  In your country, for similar work, wages for women are 
1 = Significantly below those of men                                                                                                              
7 = Equal to those of men 
No 2.14 
Basis of hiring 
decisions 
10.14 Senior management positions in your country are 
1 = Usually held by relatives                                                                                                                           
7 = Held by professionals managers chosen based on superior qualification 
Yes 
Qn 10.14 
2.01 
Role of World Bank 12.01  The World Bank performs an effective role in promoting a pro-private sector 
development/pro-investment climate 
1 = Very ineffective       7 = Very effective 
12.02  The World Bank performs an effective role in promoting socio-economic 
development and poverty alleviation 
1 = Very ineffective       7 = Very effective 
Yes 
Qn 12.01A 
Qn 12.01B 
1.10 
1.11 
Role of IMF 12.03  The International Monetary Fund (IMF) performs an effective role in promoting a 
pro-private sector development/pro-investment climate 
1 = Very ineffective       7 = Very effective 
12.04  The International Monetary Fund (IMF) performs an effective role in promoting the 
maintenance of high levels of employment and real income 
1 = Very ineffective       7 = Very effective 
Yes  
Qn 12.02A 
Qn 12.02B 
1.10 
1.12 
 
 
 
 
